diff mbox series

[v7,6/6] mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create

Message ID 20221209160453.3246150-7-jeffxu@google.com
State New
Headers show
Series mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC | expand

Commit Message

Jeff Xu Dec. 9, 2022, 4:04 p.m. UTC
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>

The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
memfd_create.

The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
being created.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
 include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
 mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
 security/security.c           | 5 +++++
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

Comments

Casey Schaufler Dec. 9, 2022, 5:02 p.m. UTC | #1
On 12/9/2022 8:04 AM, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
>
> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> memfd_create.
>
> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> being created.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
>  mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
>  security/security.c           | 5 +++++
>  5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index ec119da1d89b..fd40840927c8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
>  	 unsigned long arg)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, memfd_create, char *name, unsigned int flags)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>  	 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 4ec80b96c22e..5a18a6552278 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -543,6 +543,10 @@
>   *	simple integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
>   *	should never be used by the security module.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @memfd_create:
> + *	@name is the name of memfd file.
> + *	@flags is the flags used in memfd_create.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @mmap_addr :
>   *	Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
>   *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ca1b7109c0db..5b87a780822a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
>  int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
>  void security_file_free(struct file *file);
>  int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
> +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags);
>  int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
>  			unsigned long flags);
>  int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
> @@ -963,6 +964,11 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +

Add a proper kernel doc comment for this function.

>  static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
>  				     unsigned long flags)
>  {
> diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
> index 92f0a5765f7c..f04ed5f0474f 100644
> --- a/mm/memfd.c
> +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> @@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
>  		goto err_name;
>  	}
>  
> +	/* security hook for memfd_create */
> +	error = security_memfd_create(name, flags);
> +	if (error)
> +		return error;
> +
>  	if (flags & MFD_HUGETLB) {
>  		file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE,
>  					HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 79d82cb6e469..57788cf94075 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
>  
> +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(memfd_create, 0, name, flags);
> +}
> +
>  int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
>  {
>  	return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
Paul Moore Dec. 9, 2022, 6:29 p.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
>
> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> memfd_create.
>
> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> being created.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
>  mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
>  security/security.c           | 5 +++++
>  5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
accompany a new LSM hook.  Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
well as future LSM implementations.  Also, while the BPF LSM is
definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
perspective.
Casey Schaufler Dec. 13, 2022, 3:37 p.m. UTC | #3
On 12/13/2022 7:00 AM, Jeff Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
>>>
>>> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
>>> memfd_create.
>>>
>>> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
>>> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
>>> being created.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
>>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
>>> ---
>>>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>>>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
>>>  include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
>>>  mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
>>>  security/security.c           | 5 +++++
>>>  5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>> We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
>> accompany a new LSM hook.  Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
>> has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
>> well as future LSM implementations.  Also, while the BPF LSM is
>> definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
>> implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
>> Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
>> perspective.
>>
> Thanks for the comments.
> Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel  to block executable
> memfd creation ?
> Alternatively,  it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
> landlock, it will be a larger change.

I expect you'll get other opinions, but I'd be happy with a small LSM
that does sophisticated memory fd controls. I also expect that the
SELinux crew would like to see a hook included there.

>
> Thanks
>
> Jeff
>
>
>> --
>> paul-moore.com
Paul Moore Dec. 13, 2022, 7:22 p.m. UTC | #4
On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 10:00 AM Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> > >
> > > The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> > > memfd_create.
> > >
> > > The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> > > to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> > > being created.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > >  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > >  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
> > >  include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
> > >  mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
> > >  security/security.c           | 5 +++++
> > >  5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> >
> > We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
> > accompany a new LSM hook.  Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
> > has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
> > well as future LSM implementations.  Also, while the BPF LSM is
> > definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
> > implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
> > Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
> > perspective.
>
> Thanks for the comments.
> Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel  to block executable
> memfd creation ?

If you would be proposing the LSM only to meet the requirement of
providing an in-tree LSM example, no that would definitely *not* be
okay.

Proposing a new LSM involves documenting a meaningful security model,
implementing it, developing tests, going through a (likely multi-step)
review process, and finally accepting the long term maintenance
responsibilities of this new LSM.  If you are proposing a new LSM
because you feel the current LSMs do not provide a security model
which meets your needs, then yes, proposing a new LSM might be a good
idea.  However, if you are proposing a new LSM because you don't want
to learn how to add a new hook to an existing LSM, then I suspect you
are misguided/misinformed with the amount of work involved in
submitting a new LSM.

> Alternatively,  it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
> landlock, it will be a larger change.

It will be a much smaller change than submitting a new LSM, and it
would have infinitely more value to the community than a throw-away
LSM where the only use-case is getting your code merged upstream.
Jeff Xu Dec. 13, 2022, 11:05 p.m. UTC | #5
On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 11:22 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 10:00 AM Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> > > >
> > > > The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> > > > memfd_create.
> > > >
> > > > The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> > > > to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> > > > being created.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> > > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> > > > ---
> > > >  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > > >  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
> > > >  include/linux/security.h      | 6 ++++++
> > > >  mm/memfd.c                    | 5 +++++
> > > >  security/security.c           | 5 +++++
> > > >  5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
> > > accompany a new LSM hook.  Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
> > > has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
> > > well as future LSM implementations.  Also, while the BPF LSM is
> > > definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
> > > implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
> > > Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
> > > perspective.
> >
> > Thanks for the comments.
> > Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel  to block executable
> > memfd creation ?
>
> If you would be proposing the LSM only to meet the requirement of
> providing an in-tree LSM example, no that would definitely *not* be
> okay.
>
> Proposing a new LSM involves documenting a meaningful security model,
> implementing it, developing tests, going through a (likely multi-step)
> review process, and finally accepting the long term maintenance
> responsibilities of this new LSM.  If you are proposing a new LSM
> because you feel the current LSMs do not provide a security model
> which meets your needs, then yes, proposing a new LSM might be a good
> idea.  However, if you are proposing a new LSM because you don't want
> to learn how to add a new hook to an existing LSM, then I suspect you
> are misguided/misinformed with the amount of work involved in
> submitting a new LSM.
>
> > Alternatively,  it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
> > landlock, it will be a larger change.
>
> It will be a much smaller change than submitting a new LSM, and it
> would have infinitely more value to the community than a throw-away
> LSM where the only use-case is getting your code merged upstream.
>
Thanks, my original thought is this LSM will be used by ChromeOS,
since all of its memfd shall be non-executable. That said, I see the community
will benefit more with this in SELinux.

I will work to add this in SELinux, appreciate help while I'm learning
to add this.

Jeff

> --
> paul-moore.com
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec119da1d89b..fd40840927c8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	 unsigned long arg)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, memfd_create, char *name, unsigned int flags)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 4ec80b96c22e..5a18a6552278 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -543,6 +543,10 @@ 
  *	simple integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
  *	should never be used by the security module.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @memfd_create:
+ *	@name is the name of memfd file.
+ *	@flags is the flags used in memfd_create.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @mmap_addr :
  *	Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
  *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca1b7109c0db..5b87a780822a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -384,6 +384,7 @@  int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags);
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 			unsigned long flags);
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
@@ -963,6 +964,11 @@  static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 				     unsigned long flags)
 {
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 92f0a5765f7c..f04ed5f0474f 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -356,6 +356,11 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 		goto err_name;
 	}
 
+	/* security hook for memfd_create */
+	error = security_memfd_create(name, flags);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
 	if (flags & MFD_HUGETLB) {
 		file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE,
 					HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 79d82cb6e469..57788cf94075 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@  int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 
+int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(memfd_create, 0, name, flags);
+}
+
 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);